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It has become customary in Janet Frame studies to emphasize the “superior 
knowledge or instinctive wisdom” (Bazin 24) enjoyed by children, and point to the 
disintegration thereof as concurrent with their imitation of adults’ brand of 
conformism. In their careful readings of the author’s early novels, the feminist critics 
Gina Mercer and Tessa Barringer have given these considerations a new twist: 
Barringer argues that the “entry into language and the social order,” which occurs 
when the child-mother bond is disrupted, “deprives the child of her unique and 
individual voice, the voice of imagination and of dream, the unrestrained expression 
associated with the primal drives of Kristeva’s semiotic” (71). Although Frame’s texts 
indeed sustain that the child-figure’s “instinctive wisdom” is superior to that of adults 
so long as it is unmediated by language and concepts – i.e. symbolic knowledge – I 
remain under the impression that establishing a strong equivalence between the 
nonconceptual order in Frame and a feminine realm of existence may at times prove 
rather misleading. Quite in the line of Barringer, Mercer indeed construes the “warm,” 
“nurturing” and female-shaped “pockets, hollows, gaps and crevices” (39) in which 
children revel as the “source of life and creativity” (31), which she then opposes to the 
death-drive of contemporary culture. However, in dissociating the locus of creation 
from that of death and dissolution, it becomes almost inevitable to blend imagination 
with escapism, or the knack of preserving one’s innocence in the face of the world’s 
overwhelming darkness. My suggestion, therefore, is to think the nonconceptual 
otherwise, not in the light of feminist discourses, but as shaped by Frame’s 
longstanding interest in Buddhist epistemology which, going beyond and 
encompassing the feminist linguistic approach, posits that the real in its utter 
complexities, with its intimations of life and of death, is the void of dissolution as it is 
empty of any permanent, and thence graspable, essence (Watts 42).72F1 Sharp as it may 
                                                     
1. Frame’s interest in Buddhism is well recorded: she recalls in her Autobiography that she “had been studying 
Buddhism” as a student (156), and in her restricted circle of friends, many – i.e. Peter Elizabeth Dawson, Jim and 
Jacquie Baxter, Ruth Dallas, Charles Brasch – shared her interest in Buddhist thought. An entry in Charles Brasch’s 
diary reads “Jim Jacquie [Baxter] & Janet [Frame] to dinner. Talk mostly about meditation” (collected in Dear Charles 
Dear Janet, 20). As far as her fiction is concerned, her sixth novel, A State of Siege, echoes in many ways Evans-Wentz’s 
The Tibetan Book of the Dead. The description of “The Clear Light” (the state of the non-ego) in The Tibetan Book of the 
Dead (97) and of the main protagonist reaching “first silence” (a condition of non-distinction) in A State of Siege (160) 
are remarkably close. What is more, the main protagonist’s peregrination in the novel, as her consciousness is letting 
By dint of a close reading of “A Note on the Russian War” (The Lagoon), 
 “Prizes” and “Royal Icing” (The Reservoir), this essay examines what Janet Frame calls “a 
fence of being” in “A Note.” In the Framean text, when individuals, especially children, 
surround themselves with fences of being, they renounce any true intimacy with other selves 
and with the real. Conversely, the absence of boundaries between one identity and the next or 
between the self and the world is not simply the condition known by deceased consciousnesses 
in Frame’s haunting universe, for it is also the natural state of the human essence. 
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be, Buddhist wisdom explains, the knife of symbolic knowledge will never succeed in 
carving any form out of a reality that is shapeless as water, in which forms exist not in 
“their own right, but only in relation to one another” (Watts 41; see also Suzuki 21). 
To know the world, one must in fact discard the kind of discriminating consciousness 
that endeavours to “grasp the fluid forms of nature in its mesh of fixed classes” 
(Watts 42) and plunge instead into the void, something which, as we will see, the 
author’s characters and her critics often misconstrue as a death sentence. 
The tendency displayed by Frame’s critics to dismiss children’s awareness of death 
can be traced back to Patrick Evans to whom the “pattern in which images of a happy 
and secure childhood [recede] momentarily to admit a terrifying image of the pain of 
adult life, dominates nearly all the stories in The Lagoon” (40). The absolute bleakness 
of the outcome, Evans goes on, makes way for a more positive alternative in “A Note 
on the Russian War” (in The Lagoon), a rather mysterious tale focusing on a family 
playing in their garden, sunflowers, living in Russia and the outbreak of a war – hence 
perhaps Ian Richards’ contentious comment that the text “reads as something 
incoherent, the product of a troubled author” (126). To Evans, “A Note on the 
Russian War” represents an “important development in Janet Frame’s art” in that it 
exemplifies that the means of escape from the “harsh and unpleasant world” of adults 
lies “within the self, the individual world of insight and imagination” (Evans 44). 
Richards makes a similar point in arguing that the mother holding a sunflower in her 
hand and repeating that “we are Russian because we have this sunflower in the 
garden” (Lagoon 151) must necessarily appear as childish to the reader as it is “the 
behaviour of an innocent” (Richards 128). Contrary to Evans, Richards invests “the 
essentially abstract, escapist pleasure offered by sunflowers as catalyst for imagination” 
with a negative significance and concludes that the children should offer “resistance to 
the power of imaginative capture exercised by the mother” (Richards 131) to grow up 
and face the real world. Notwithstanding their divergence of opinion as to the moral 
value of imagination, both critics are in essence situating the mainspring of children’s 
creativity in their denial of the world’s darkness. 
The irony, however, is that a close reading of the text would reveal that the 
sunflower is less a springboard for any escapist drive than an earthly avatar of the 
natural which in Frame is always instrumental in breaching human fortresses of selves, 
and is thus perceived as the enemy itself. Retrenched behind their castle of identities, 
armoured personalities indeed frequently find themselves besieged by inconvenient 
memories or abstractions such as time and death, or by other selves and by the 
natural. This is very much the informing principle of, among other texts, “A Night of 
Frost and a Morning of Mist” (in Snowman), where a tomcat and a blowfly that 
embody “the armies of life and death which emerge with the sun, from a night of 
frost and a morning of mist” (Snowman 108) are clamouring for some sort of entry in 
an unyielding narrator’s mental and actual abode. 73F2 Several of Frame’s short stories 
thus point to the fact that all trespassers, and so the sunflowers, are more often than 
not treated as enemies to be vanquished. The juxtaposition of the extremities of “A 
                                                                                                                                       
go of life, corresponds in many ways to the deceased traversing different after-death planes in The Tibetan Book of the 
Dead. 
2. Other texts that centre on similar intrusions are for instance “A Windy Day” and “Visitors from the Fields” 
(also in Snowman, Snowman), and A State of Siege.  
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Note” provides an alternative point of entry to the tale that suggests a similar 
conclusion: 
The sunflowers got us, the black seeds stuck in our hair, my mother went about saying 
in a high voice like the wind, sunflowers kiddies, ah sunflowers. (Lagoon 151) 
We were just Russian children on the Steppes, singing tra-tra-tra, quietly with our 
mother and father, but war comes whatever you sing. (153) 
The narrator’s claim that “the sunflowers got us” not only alludes to the fact that 
“A Note” focuses, literally, on a garden war, 74F3 but it also carries a hint that the safety 
enjoyed by the family at the close of the tale is relative since the threat of invasion is 
actualized in the opening lines; as the narrator concludes, “war comes whatever you 
sing.” 
Quite in keeping with this, the child-narrator in “A Note” had foreseen that the 
“war rolling through the grass” would be “something about sunflowers and a tall sky” 
(Lagoon 151). The uncanny dangerousness of the plant may very well reside in its 
endemic multiplication, conveyed in the subtle shift in emphasis from the assertion 
that “we are Russian because we have this sunflower in the garden” (152) to the hint 
that “in the Russian War [...] [w]e had sunflowers by the fence” (152).75F4 Poised on the 
family’s garden fence, the symbol par excellence of the border between one’s territory 
(of self) and the remainder of the world, the flowers launch their offensive and this is 
why “out of the spring and summer days the War came. An ordinary war like the 
Hundred Years or the Wars of the Roses or the Great War where my father went and 
sang Tipperary” (152, emphasis mine). Thus, at a deeper level of interpretation, “A 
Note” encodes a concern with a self-consolidating epistemology and ontology centred 
on violence and which accounts for the fact that even the multiplication of a flower is 
seen as a declaration of war.76F5 For all their presumed innocence, the children are well-
prepared for the battle as they have trained to “[stick their] teeth through the bitter 
stems” of flowers (152) and sing “tra-tra-tra” (153), in tune with their mother and 
father, to cover up their mounting fear. If the first sentence in the tale – “The 
sunflowers got us” (152) – indeed is an anachronistic intimation of “defeat,” it also 
carries a suggestion that the mother has thrust aside her initial terror at the prospect of 
the invasion. She cries out in delight “sunflowers kiddies, ah sunflowers” (152) as she 
now relishes the presence of the trespassers. Her welcoming stance may very well be 
fuelled by a disavowal of sorts of the frontiers erected between the “same” and the 
“foreign,” the “self” and the “other” or “enemy” which, she deems, are human 
inventions. She strikes a lyrical note when she explains to her children that “there are 
no lands outside, they are fenced inside us, a fence of being and we are the world” 
(152).77F6 What the mother is saying in a nutshell is that “New Zealand” or “Russia” are 
                                                     
3. For a further discussion of Frame’s literal use of language, see Marc Delrez’s article in the same volume. 
4. Frame similarly anthropomorphizes plants in an essay called “Departures and Returns,” when she explains that, 
though the roots of the fig tree (the poet) “go deep,” the plant is nonetheless capable of “invad[ing] territory where it’s 
not welcome, and then it is cut down, killed in spite of its fruit” (91).   
5. For a further discussion on the universalizing of the theme of war to domestic circumstances, see Marc Delrez’s 
“Conquest of Surfaces,” 139. 
6. Aptly in a text that defends the deterritorialization of selves, the narrator’s voice is hardly distinguishable from 
that of her mother. It may very well be, then, that the assertion that “there are no lands outside, they are fenced inside 
us, a fence of being and we are the world” stems from both consciousnesses. To complicate matters further, this 
process of deterritorialization is horizontal as well as vertical for it occurs “in space and time” (151, emphasis mine). 
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but concepts that become meaningless once outside the symbolic order. However, to 
uncover the full complexities of this seemingly stale assertion, one must seek a ground 
of exploration other than the western “pure” linguistic perspective and approach it 
instead within the ambit of Buddhist wisdom with its emphasis on the non-dual 
nature of concrete reality (see Conze 171). 
While Buddhism sees the world as made up of elements and events that are devoid 
of clear boundaries,78F7 formal knowledge has devised sealed classes to apprehend the 
real and “insists that life [should] be bound and fitted to its rigid categories” (Watts 
19). Thus, although “the reality of all inseparable opposites” is “that ‘between’ for 
which we have no words” (Watts 121), the mind that relies on dualisms dichotomizes 
occurrences such as beginning and end or life and death, stone beings and creatures of 
flesh, men and women, adults and children, and usually values one of the terms of 
each antinomy above the other. To Frame, it is precisely this hierarchization of the 
living and of the inanimate which paves the way for egotistical conflicts, as though the 
locus of war was indeed to be situated in the realm of the symbolic. Not only is a logic 
of exclusion driven ad absurdum perfectly represented in the parallel that is made 
between historical and garden wars in “A Note,”  but the text also intimates that the 
territorialization of selves by such concepts – when they are “fenced inside us, a fence 
of being” (Lagoon 151-152) – has dire ontological consequences as well. In accord with 
the Buddhist perception that we have “no other selves than the totality of things of 
which [we] are aware” (Watts 120), characters in Frame are the world, yet they cease 
to be at one with it when they call upon those spurious fences of being and decide to 
exist only in the realm of the symbolic. A contrario, the characters who seek to alleviate 
their ontological homelessness constantly probe beyond the words and this is why, 
true to her conviction, the mother transports herself and her children, imaginatively, 
to Russia. Far from testifying to a longing for escape, imagination is a means of 
crossing over the dark portals of life towards territories so far uncharted. This can be 
seen to concur with the hypothesis that in smothering their imagination, the child-
characters’ birth in the symbolic also endangers their peculiar brand of belonging in 
the world. 
If enlightenment or Satori in Zen Buddhism “consists in reaching the point where 
all our discriminatory notions are done away with,” where “a new world hitherto 
unperceived in the confusion of a dualistic mind” begins to unfold (Suzuki 89, 58), 
children in Frame could be said to go through what may be termed by analogy a 
“counter-satori experience,” an enlightenment in reverse whereby one’s total awareness 
                                                                                                                                       
This undoubtedly explains the kind of commuting between past and present that is perhaps conveyed in the now adult 
narrator’s assertion that she will “never forget being in Russia” (151). 
7. As Suzuki explains, “all things have the character of emptiness, they have no beginning, no end, they are 
faultless and not faultless, they are not perfect and not imperfect” (Suzuki 21). On the face of it, Buddhism emerges as 
a mode of knowledge which opposes the rigid dualities that are central to Platonism for instance. Thus, even though 
there exist some affinities between the Buddhist and the Platonist approaches to Frame insofar as both philosophies 
posit that, to paraphrase Jan Cronin, “man remains trapped in the realm of the shadow” (Cronin 15), probing beyond 
these shadows is according to Platonist discourses impossible given that the un-obscured sphere of existence is located 
outside our everyday reality (see Cronin 15). Buddhism, by contrast, trusts that the individual can escape from the 
entrapment of shadows if s/he ceases only to be “clouded” by preconceived ideas about what the real should be. 
Because the un-obscured sphere of experience is simply a reality which is not territorialized by ideas of, for instance, 
perfection and imperfection and which, as a result, is of this world, the blockage of human perceptions is by no means 
final in Buddhism. 
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of life is discarded in favour of a discriminating consciousness. Fences of being, the 
bearings which define identities and provide individuals with a spurious sense of 
protection, are a key notion in the Framean text and shall be my point of entry into 
two neighbouring tales in The Reservoir, “Prizes” and “Royal Icing.” I will show that the 
territorialization of being conditions the extraction of children from the pre-symbolic 
order and thwarts their (re-)entry into what Frame variously calls the “area of 
universal belonging” (Siege, 186), the “common pool” (Intensive Care 13), or the 
“huddle” (“Prizes” Reservoir, 19). My intention in what follows is to collapse the 
distinction between the a-symbolic vista of children revelling in the “huddle,” and the 
utopian condition of shared being identities know in the “common pool,” the latter of 
which has tended to be defined not merely as a creative selflessness (a feature the pool 
shares with the huddle) but also as a post-mortem fate (see Delbaere-Garant 153 and 
Delrez 98).79F8 In accordance with Frame’s description of these orders of reality in 
“Prizes,” I shall refer to the locus of separate identities as “the pit” and to its perfect 
antithesis as the “huddle.” I will show that if the real is a plane of existence which 
remains untouched by symbolic knowledge, unadulterated by discriminating egos, and 
if it may be experienced not just by the dead but by children for instance, it entails that 
the huddle is not to be located exclusively in “that” world beyond disintegration, for it 
also belongs to “this” world of the living. 
Even though I have warned against constructing innocence as a death-free zone, I 
nonetheless agree with Evans and Richards that the author’s short stories and early 
novels abound in tales of threatened childhood and lost Edens. That adulthood by 
contrast should be seen as a fallen state is sustained in Owls Do Cry but also, perhaps 
even more explicitly, in “Prizes” where “dark sneaks in” (“Swans” Lagoon, 64) just 
when the child-protagonist develops a porousness not to (pace Evans and Richards) 
the realities of death, but to consensus thinking. Appropriately enough, the tale opens 
with the narrator’s lament that her childhood should have been turned into a painful 
plucking, feather by feather, of her angel’s wings: 
Life is hell but at least there are prizes. Or so one thought. One knew of the pit ahead, 
of the grownups lying there rewarded, arranged, and faded, who were so long ago 
bright as poppies. One learned to take one’s own deserved place on the edge, ready to 
leap, not to hang back in a status-free huddle where bodies were warm together and the 
future darkness seemed less frightening. Therefore, one learned to win prizes, to be 
surrounded in sleep by a dream of ordinal numbers. (“Prizes” Reservoir, 19)  
Keen on demonstrating the extent to which her former self used to be convinced 
that prizes could be a solace for living in hell, the narrator meticulously catalogues, 
throughout the tale, her “share of prizes, and of resentment when nobody recognized 
[her] efforts” (19). Also, she recounts with some guilt how, engrossed in the 
knowledge of her academic superiority, she often derided the “stodgiest” (23) or most 
unpopular pupils in the class, following in fact her teachers’ example. Unsurprisingly 
the long list of prizes overlapping for a great part with details from Frame’s 
autobiography has prompted some to read the story as the author’s tribute to the 
                                                     
8. We will see that, in the huddle, children know a condition of selflessness that is also typical of death since death 
is the ultimate state of undifferentiatedness. To complicate the matter further, however, the individuals in the pit, 
because they are reluctant to endorse such a condition of non-being (unlike children and the dead), are seen to be 
dead, not literally so, but on a spiritual level. 
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nascence of her artistic self.80F9 Indeed, in calling a 2009 volume of Frame’s selected 
stories Prizes,81F10 its editors clearly state that they too acknowledge her artistic gift. 
Celebrating the writer in such a fashion is, however, highly ironical since the short 
story itself relentlessly condemns the hierarchization of selves that underpins the 
search for, or the granting of, prizes –  even literary ones. 
Critics have often noted that the endorsement of materialist values condemns the 
individual to a sluggish existence in Janet Frame’s texts,82F11 yet very few have delved 
into the raison d’être of this notion in connection to the author’s concern with human 
existential loneliness and incompleteness. Indeed, the dream of ordinal numbers 
which, in the quoted passage, cuts through all entanglements with individuals in the 
huddle is but a manifestation of those fences of being that separate the knower from 
the known and create a no-man’s land between one self and the other. Intrigued by 
the nature of children, the narrator in “Jan Godfrey” crucially intuits that the 
individuals caracoling in the huddle (here the big playground) are unable to locate the 
boundaries of their identities and therefore know a condition of selflessness:  
We cling to our names because we think they emphasise our separateness and 
completeness and importance, but deep down we know that we are neither separate nor 
complete nor very important, nor are we terribly happy (Alison Hendry, Margaret Burt, 
Nancy Smith, children) playing mud-pies by ourselves in a tiny backyard when other 
kids are out in the big playground over the fence, look what I’ve made, race you 
Charlie, tell tale tit your tongue shall be split and all the little puppy dogs shall come and 
have a bit.  
You can tell that the kids in the playground haven’t got names. (Lagoon 131) 
Having little interest in the symbolic, the children in the big playground do not 
resort to strategies of self-definition by means of exclusion and feel free, on that 
account, not to emphasize their separateness by playing mud-pies on their own. The 
tiny backyard in which children learn to nurse their individuality in “Jan Godfrey” 
qualifies in this context as a variant of the pit in “Prizes” which, though it is the abode 
of countless individuals, allows no transactions between selves. These considerations 
not only carry a hint that the shortcoming of prizes, names and other symbolic fences 
is to be ascribed to their potential for division but also that the process of 
individuation whereby children territorialize their selves is nothing other than the fall 
into the pit, a hellish place where what you are belongs to you alone. If the pit indeed 
is the area of universal nonbelonging, the upshot is that the process of individuation 
must necessarily be seen as a satori in reverse and a spiritual regression of the gravest 
kind. 
The move from huddle to pit, from the locus of dissolution to that of self-
contained identities, is a descent into loneliness which is eventually upheld tooth and 
nail out of a belief that the dissolution of the discriminating ego is not a melting into 
life but a death sentence. This approach, which incidentally runs counter to the 
                                                     
9. One thinks most notably of the guinea which Janet spent on piano lessons in the chapter of the autobiography 
entitled “Faust and The Piano” (105-109).  
10. One of the reviewers says for instance that “the title story is not about simple triumph, but a sharply satiric 
account of a young girl whose excellence is clawed away from her by the steady efforts of mediocre and conformist 
rivals” (see Murray Bramwell on http://www.nzbooks.org.nz/la testeditorial.html). 
11. See for instance Patrick Evans, Janet Frame or Anna Rutherford, “Janet Frame’s Divided and Distinguished 
Worlds.”  
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Buddhist understanding of selflessness, is typically that of the narrators’ parents in 
“Royal Icing” who consider life as a “slowly closing wound where the edges must be 
prevented at all costs from uniting” (Reservoir 40). This, in turn, prompts their daughter 
to link her parents’ yearning for material possessions which they cannot afford with 
their fear for sealed edges, as though dreams could be “wedge[d] between birth and 
death” to “stretch life, like a tightening shoe, to make it fit for ever and ever” (40). 
Year after year, when the mother ices the cake for Christmas, both parents agree that: 
“We need a set of those things, you know, they use them for icing cakes.”  
“One of these days,” my mother said. “We never know, do we, one of these days?” 
“Who knows?” my father said.  
That was a mysterious conversation. (34) 
Eventually, the “set of icing-forcers” (38) is purchased, yet it is never put to use 
and is placed instead “beside the few pieces of china which were too good to be used” 
(39), where it becomes “a landmark on the sideboard” (40). It is interesting to note 
here that the china cup, plate and saucer have been offered by the narrator in “Prizes” 
to her mother with the prize-money she earned for some poems; a link which 
vindicates the approach to “Royal Icing” as a continuation of “Prizes.” Locking up the 
china dishes in the cupboard, the mother declares that she is “keeping the set for 
when she could really use it” (21). Sadly, she dies before finding an occasion grand (or 
Royal) enough to eat from her daughter’s six-and-fourpenny gift to her. Thus, the 
unnecessary complication between “using something and really using it” (21) hinted at 
in “Prizes” is further examined in “Royal Icing” where, as we are going to see, it 
evidences a half-acceptance and, in fine, also a half-rejection of overflowing boundaries 
on the mother’s part. 
The various threads traversing these two neighbouring tales curiously converge in 
the image of the iced cake which, as the following passage illustrates, has been topped 
with more than one layer of significance so that, clearly, Frame is having her cake and 
eating it: 
[M]y mother continued icing the cake [the old way], dipping the knife in hot water and 
spreading, coaxing, trying not to mind when the stuff ran down the sides and the pink 
icing flowed into the white. 
And so our lives continued and we did not think that fact mysterious because we 
expected it; aunts, uncles, grandparents, people over the road or in the next street were 
for dying in the end but we were for being alive; with so many fat spaniel dogs lying 
down in the corner of the washhouse to have puppies, we had no choice. 
The fleas were such a worry. What if they spread to the neighbors? (34-35) 
That, in the absence of an icing forcer, the pink and the white icing fail to keep to 
their assigned places on the cake can be seen to illustrate that the boundary between 
living and dying is not as definite as the parents would like it to be. Likewise, fleas or, 
for that matter, sunflowers know no frontiers and may spread to the neighbours or 
encroach on one’s private territory. To those who, like the protagonist’s parents, 
assume that dying is akin to a union of edges, these invasions or moments of 
overflowing are surely so many intimations of mortality so that, in retrospect, it 
becomes possible to infer that adults “share the pit, each in her [or his] assigned 
place” (23) precisely because they have grown distrustful of huddles where identities 
have no clear boundaries, a state which they now assimilate with the utter physical 
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disintegration that coincides with death. In this sense, “the adroit targeting of an icing 
forcer” (37) can prove a useful ally in the struggle against reunification: “they’re like 
guns,” pronounces an awed mother, “you can use them for shooting out biscuit 
dough into any shape you want” (35).  
Ultimately, then, the baker’s utensil must be added to the already long list of ice-
picks, scissors, knives and axes with which human beings carve the rims of their 
identities. Interestingly, this can be seen to invalidate the narrator’s final assertion that 
the desire to possess is a form of escapism, aimed at shunning the knowledge that 
death is looming close: 
Tell me, what do we need? What dream must we pursue and not be afraid to grasp and 
possess when it finally becomes reality? Is it better to want and get an icing forcer, a 
mincer, than to walk for the remainder of our lives about the house with a little dagger 
in our pocket trying to catch Death bending over the coal in the coal house or tying up 
the stray broad beans or sweet peas on the trellis, or sitting in the sun snoring? Trying 
to catch and kill him, and then with a surprised look on our face, turning the dagger to 
our own heart? (40) 
What the narrator cannot quite comprehend is that the icing set, in its capacity as 
an instrument of separation, perfectly equips the numerous individuals who deceive 
themselves into thinking that mortality can be stabbed to death. Quite in the same 
line, there is a definite suggestion in the text that the accumulation and use of objects 
of prestige in a household has to be underpinned by an impulse to fight death given 
that disintegration by decay is also the enemy of inanimate objects. The icing-forcers 
must be cleaned thoroughly after use, insists the father repeatedly, “we don’t want 
them to get rusty, like the mincer, or stuck with scum, like the separator” (38). Thus, 
whoever owns an icing set has the responsibility of “perform[ing] the agility known as 
‘coping,’” which the narrator takes to mean “creeping up to one’s enemies, 
unsuspected, and enveloping them in a dark cloth, perhaps smothering them” (38). In 
the last analysis, then, Frame may be indicting the attachment to material goods fitted 
with guns, smothering bags or daggers as part of yet a larger, more disturbing 
tendency in human beings to keep otherness at bay through the compartmentalization 
of selves. 
I wish to argue at this juncture that the distinction that is drawn between the 
endorsement of materialist values and the lucid acknowledgement of mortality is as 
spurious as the gulf supposedly separating birth and death, the edges of the wound. 
Therefore, what the mother perceives when she sees death “bending over the coal in 
the coal house or [...] tying up the broad beans and the sweet peas that had strayed 
from the trellis” (40) is a mirror image of herself performing these daily chores. Death 
is, in other words, no external threat but a growth of darkness each living creature 
accommodates internally and this is why, when we try to “catch and kill him,” we 
realize with a “surprised look that” we have turned the dagger “to our own heart” 
(40). As such, the statement made in “Royal Icing” that death is indestructible is 
something of a truism, unless one is to keep in mind that death is an overflowing of 
artificial boundaries, described in Daughter Buffalo as the turning point when the self 
fails to “control its natural impulse to flow” and “the one, no longer self-contained, 
[becomes] the many” (106). Again, though, one should not conclude from this that 
the “unfencing” of the self or the relinquishing of exclusionary protocols of 
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knowledge is, by contrast, necessarily lethal. In The Carpathians, for instance, survival is 
equated “with maintaining point of view, indeed with being as a point of view” 
(“Note,” n.p.) so that, when Mattina’s viewpoint is robbed by an imposter novelist for 
a quarter of the novel, her very life threatens to disintegrate into nothingness. Yet she 
eventually emerges from the parenthesis in which she was maintained quite safely.83F12 
To complicate things further, death is not always made apposite to the dissolution of 
the controlling ego: in “Snowman, Snowman” and in A State of Siege, Rosemary Dincer 
and Malfred Signal are both made to accommodate the real after their death in the 
sense that they respectively suffer the invasion of scurrying insects and of a storm 
which, in gnawing through skins, walls, windows and other boundaries, allow at last 
what had been kept outside and rejected as “other” to flow inside.84F13 At any rate, 
suffice it to say by this point that “A Note on the Russian War” and “Royal Icing” but 
also, as we shall see, “Prizes,” sustain that overflowings and invasions are as inevitable 
as they are natural and that, no matter how dutifully adults stand in their assigned 
places in the pit, the natural world, other selves and death will intrude, for “war comes 
whatever you sing” (“A Note” Lagoon, 153). 
If this fluidity, the kind of undifferentiatedness which human beings experience in 
death or, crucially, in the status-free huddle, is indeed the true nature of the human 
essence – and this must be taken to mean that human beings have no individual 
essence or self-nature since they are the world – then the path leading to authenticity 
involves either progressing forward towards utter or spiritual disintegration or 
backwards to a womb-like state. In this case, the image of the overflowing icing may 
very well be a metaphor for the human essence when, prior to the violent meddling of 
the icing-forcers, it interpenetrates with other selves. In “Prizes” it is acknowledged 
that individuals are in part responsible for their fall into the pit, yet attention is also 
called to the fact that children learn to take their deserved place on its edge, ready to 
leap. And, since this learning is fraught with violence, it is by internalizing the violence 
deployed to march individuals to their assigned places that children serve the status 
quo. For her part, the narrator comes to understand this when, during one of her 
return trips to the town of her childhood, she comes across two of the girls whom she 
used to scorn. They have become beautiful women, whirling in prams their 
“cocooned, quilted, embroidered treasure” (Reservoir 23). And she, who is twenty-five 
years old and childless, realizes how miserable she must appear wearing a “dirty old 
gabardine” and “dowdy clothes” (23): 
They smiled at me and I smiled at them. We shared the pit, each in her place. The rain 
poured upon the bed of crushed poppies between us. Yet the delicacy and distance of 
the two women were unmistakable; I grudged their proud cloaks as they trooped, 
clients of love, on their specially reserved side of the world. (23)  
That the bed of poppies has been trampled on perhaps by trooping individuals 
prone to defend their reserved side of the world obliquely alludes to the violence with 
                                                     
12. For a further discussion of this topic, see my article entitled “The Poetics of Dissolution: The Representation 
of Maori Culture in Janet Frame’s Fiction,” Journal of Postcolonial Writing 46.2 (May 2010): 209-220. 
13. In this, Frame’s poetics can be seen once to bear some similarities to Buddhism (more particularly in this case, 
to its Tibetan form) where death is seen as an intermediary stage where identification is still possible and may or may 
not be renounced after a length of time which varies according to individuals (see Conze 221-236). It could be argued 
in this context that Malfred’s last round of identification in A State of Siege, before she lets go of her discriminating 
consciousness, takes place six months after her death.  
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which adults, “who were so long ago bright as poppies,” were compelled to lie in a pit 
“rewarded, arranged, and faded” (19). Through the juxtaposition of metaphor (the pit) 
with simile (“bright as poppies”), Frame is intimating that the self lies in a vault 
awaiting either its death or, Juliet-like, some kind of rebirth once it has been plucked 
from the natural. 
While it must be admitted that the loss which becoming adult implies seems 
irremediable, some provision is nonetheless made in the tale for a possible resistance 
against society’s Procrustean treatment. The children in Onui for instance are all intent 
on entering a buttonhole for the flower display, so much so that one morning they are 
rebuked by a “militant woman” who, in a speech, “accused too many people of 
entering for the Buttonhole Section [...] as [buttonholes] were an art beyond our years 
that even grownups found difficult to master” (20). The narrator remembers that she 
nevertheless persisted year after year in competing for the first, second or third prize 
of the flower display. In this particular instance, the child’s keenness for prizes 
denotes at once an acceptance of a world order based on division and categorization, 
and an unwillingness to compete in the category which befits her station in life. 
Significantly, she crosses over usual boundaries and resists the militant woman by 
“surrender[ing] her exhibit” (20). The child’s act of non-violent resistance prefigures 
in an important sense her ultimate disengagement from the conquering armies 
trooping on the earth, to which she will surrender. Her growth of understanding 
occurs when she purchases her first piece of music but happens to run across her 
piano teacher who guesses the girl’s pleasure. Having seized “a momentary aspect of 
[her pupil’s] behaviour,” Hessie Sutton begins to “[honk] with triumph like the soldier 
who brought back the golden horn from the underworld” (26). Infuriated by her 
piano teacher’s “superior parading of the victorious” (23), the child realizes that:  
People were saying, observing me closely, “She’s filling out, she’s growing tall, look at 
her hair, isn’t that Grace’s chin she’s got, and there’s no doubting where her smile 
comes from!” You see how derivative I was made out to be? Nothing belonged to me, 
not even my body, and now with Hessie Sutton and her spying ways I could not call my 
feelings my own. Why did people have so much need to stake their claim in other 
people? Were they scared of the bailiffs’ arriving in their houses? I stopped learning 
music. I was in despair. I could no longer use prizes as a fortress. In spite of my book 
bound in calf [...] and my marks of merit in the children’s newspaper, I was being 
invaded by people who wanted their prizes from me. (26) 
Instead of sharing her pupil’s excitement about buying her first music piece, the 
teacher snatches it from her, leaving the girl bereaved and angry. Quite in keeping 
with the idea that conquest prevails over communions of I’s in the adult world order, 
the only exchanges that take place between selves are anything but reciprocal and 
consist rather in mere appropriations, where the riches of someone’s essence are 
plundered by another self. 85F14 At first, it may seem that the child is being invaded 
because she has renounced using prizes as a fortress equipped for defence and 
retaliation. However, it is clear that she is invaded in spite of them by Hessie Sutton 
and the likes and therefore she wakens from the illusion that division equals 
                                                     
14. In my article “The Poetics of Dissolution: The Representation of Maori Culture in Janet Frame's Fiction,” the 
phrase “staking a claim” which often recurs in Frame’s texts is examined in some details and it is concluded that, more 
often than not, to stake one’s claim in the real (for instance in Maori culture) is to try and appropriate it.  
 120 




protection. The supreme irony in the Framean text is that, having rejected the natural 
overflowing of their essence with that of the living and of the dead, human beings fall 
prey to another kind of invasion (by predatory teachers and greedy relatives) which is 
far worse because it is no longer based on the language of communion, on the 
principle of reciprocity that governs the nonconceptual reality of the huddle. 
Therefore, human beings lie in the pit, “robbed of all prizes, while still under every 
human sky the crows wheel and swoop, dividing, dividing the spoils of the dead” 
(“Prizes” Reservoir, 26). 
To express, perhaps, a recovered faith in the fluidity of a real that contains 
intrinsically no palpable boundaries or separated essences, the narrator in “Prizes” 
dismantles the barriers isolating her self and, to me, this crucial move is a clue that 
authenticity in Frame is to be measured in terms of renunciation. A similar de-
territorialization of being allows the family in “A Note on the Russian War” to say 
that “we are Russian because we have this sunflower in the garden” (Lagoon 152). The 
impending invasion, on the other hand, perhaps prompts them to reassemble the 
discarded fences by intoning war tunes for, in the fashion of the soldiers in the Great 
War where the “father went and sang Tipperary” (152), the children sing “tra-tra-tra, 
quietly, with [their] mother and father” (153). Clearly, securing fences of beings 
partakes of an imperialist impulse which, in “A Note on the Russian War” and “Royal 
Icing,” tends to be associated with the masculine. In “Royal Icing,” the father wages a 
war against fleas, the symbolic counterparts of the fluid icing, and “leap[s] up and 
down at all hours crying, ‘Got one, Got one, Hear them Crack?’” (Reservoir 34). In 
“creeping up to [his] enemies, unsuspected,” the father can be said to perform “the 
agility known as coping” (38). And when this agility is related to the cleaning of the 
icing set, which must not go to rack and ruin lest it should lose its separating power, it 
becomes clear that those who cope and clean pledge allegiance to a world order based 
on division. It is no wonder, then, that the father often chants: “I’d rather have a hard-
boiled egg” (35), proclaiming his preference for fixed categories. 
The mother, for her part, finds that responsibility is a “terrible substance to be 
apportioned and mostly it came to rest upon the government, but the atmosphere 
could accept it just as well” (33). In other words, she distributes blame rather 
randomly in the manner that the mother-figure in “Prizes” has also adopted, “in 
exasperation, when she was pestered for raisins, dates or the last of the chocolate 
biscuits” (“Prizes” Reservoir, 22). The former’s daughter finds this a positive failure and 
wishes that schools would distribute prizes in such a fashion instead of singling out a 
few pupils for praise. My impression is that the mother-figure’s inability to select, and 
thus to exclude, possibly lifts a corner of the veil on a distrust for a reality that would 
not be complete, which she may be hinting at in “Icing” when she exclaims in horror: 
“never drink skim-milk” (36). What is more, she is a poor housekeeper with a “natural 
difficulty in coping” (38). By this token, she deems that the baker’s set is “too good to 
be used” (39) and prefers icing the cake the old way. The mother’s particular brand of 
materialism therefore is purely abstract so that, in losing their status as unattainable 
dreams to assume that of actual weapons obliging one to “cope,” objects become an 
embarrassment to her. In conferring on such weapons the mere function of 
landmarks or collectibles, she clearly unloads the guns’ lethal cargoes. The mother-
figure, in other words, responds to violence with intimations of peace and emerges in 
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this respect as the alter-ego of the mother-figure in Owls Do Cry, “whose attributes as a 
peacemaker are the pikelet and cup of tea, which are infallible, she finds, for settling 
arguments and family feuds” (Delrez Utopia, 19). Aptly, the overflowing icing in the 
short story forms a counterpart to the criss-cross patterns with which Amy decorates 
her own cakes in the novel, something which has prompted Marc Delrez to conclude 
that “the priestess of redemption is not the ‘mad’ Daphne alone, but also her mother 
Amy” (19). Thus, from The Lagoon, through Owls Do Cry down to The Reservoir, 
mother-figures disavow fences of being for they intuit that “being alive is tangled” 
(Owls 45). While I do not wish to deny that the peacemaking mother-figure sometimes 
ambivalently longs for cleanliness and deathlessness to escape from the fearful muddle 
of life, she nonetheless must be seen to rank amongst Frame’s most positive 
characters. Thus, Delrez is right to assert that the mother’s authenticity resides in her 
sense of a close-knit community but at a further remove, it seems to me that her 
inability to disentangle, select, clean or cope, sometimes aligned with a certain at-
oneness with the world,86F15 reveals her proximity with the original state of the human 
essence: its nonexistence. Indeed, the absence of division and categorization, the 
impossibility of retaining an identity or essence apart from the real, is above all the 
governing principle of the status-free huddle, in contradistinction with the pit.  
In this essay, I have attempted to demonstrate that, far from being curved into 
circularity beyond the edges of life, when the move from the “first place of fluid 
darkness” (Frame Autobiography, 7) and back again is at last complete, human destiny is 
inscribed within the void of dissolution. Death or fluidity, in other words, is not 
merely inherent in the human existence but is the human essence. We have seen in 
“Prizes” and “Royal Icing” that the accumulation of prizes and objects of prestige 
stem in fact from a desire to maintain some form of distance from other selves and 
from death which, however, exists internally. As it allows the knower to separate 
herself or himself from the known, the hierarchization of experience paves the way 
for the violence known as “coping” by virtue of which dichotomous values (one 
country versus another, the human versus the natural) are enforced. This, in turn, may 
be seen to show that reaching the nonverbal, concrete world involves on the part of 
authenticity seekers a great deal of passivity, an unwillingness to use symbols to target 
and exclude foreign bodies from their invasion-proof organisms. All this may touch 
upon a crucial aspect of Frame’s poetics for, if the fences of being that are erected 
around the self are constituted by names, tokens of prestige and other such emblems, 
this implies in an important sense that, to exist in all worlds as an “unfenced” and 
“deterritorialized” being, is to discard the symbolic. 
Indirectly perhaps, the difficulty of doing so is intimated in “Jan Godfrey” where 
names are said to be mostly useful for individuals eager to insist on their separateness, 
which may indeed be taken to indicate that identity – or at least the discriminating ego 
– is an arbitrary symbol, a fence of being. This no doubt explains why the process of 
individuation that is associated with becoming an adult in “Prizes” is a descent into a 
hellish pit where consciousness becomes stationary, and imaginative transport to 
Russia or to any other country becomes unthinkable. In fact, stationary 
                                                     
15. One thinks for instance of the short story “Swans,” in The Lagoon, in which the mother knows about the 
natural world and about death but becomes very awkward when it comes to “coping” with sad news.  
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consciousnesses are altogether unable to probe beyond their own backyard or 
temporary vault, of which the one tragically constant feature is the way it stays 
permanent (to paraphrase Frame’s A State of Siege, 167). At any rate, the point here is 
that the most trenchant weapon of exclusion may well be the blade of identity. This is 
not to assert once more that “man can become his authentic self [if] he accepts the 
boundaries of his identity as ‘a temporary token agreement’ of which he tries to make 
the most before merging into the great undifferentiated whole” (Delbaere-Garant 153) 
by dying. Janet Frame would be very pessimistic, to say the least, if she provided no 
grounds for evolution in her texts, if the counter-satori or enlightenment in reverse 
that is forced upon children were never to be compensated for at all by a genuine satori 
experience. Therefore, the redemptive potential of the achievements of children and 
mother-figures who, in “Prizes,” “Royal-Icing” and “A Note on the Russian War,” all 
wave a white flag above their heads, is not to be underestimated. “Prizes” and “Jan 
Godfrey” further make some provision for a more optimistic reading of Frame’s 
poetics of dissolution in their intimations that, in the huddle, children perhaps know a 
state of selflessness, yet they are still alive and functioning. Not only is surrendering 
one’s identity prior to death possible and desirable as it is a means of accommodating 
otherness, but it is also an artist’s duty for, as the author-figure says in Living in the 
Maniototo, “to write you have to be at the terrible point of loss” (72). Death may be a 
gateway to being for Janet Frame, but “negative capability” is another  
Cindy GABRIELLE, University of Liège 
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